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Article

Public Schools, Public Fora, and
State Aid to Religious Education

CHARLES VAN COTT*

In Mueller v. Allen,' the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Minnesota tax deduction for educational expenses over claims that
the deduction violated the establishment clause 2 by providing financial assistance to sectarian schools. Mueller marks a partial retreat
from previous Supreme Court establishment clause precedents. 3 But
the fairly simple argument advanced therein that "a program ... that
* B.A., Whittier College, 1981; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1984.
1. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
2. The religion clauses of the first amendment provide that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S.
CONST.

amend. I.

3. The Court invalidated a similar scheme a decade earlier in Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Nyquist involved a New York program
which allowed tuition reimbursement and tax deductions for low income parents whose children
attended nonpublic schools. The majority in Mueller distinguished Nyquist by pointing out
that the Minnesota scheme extended tax relief to all parents, including those whose children
attended public schools, while the New York provisions covered only parents whose children
attended nonpublic schools. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3068. This distinction is weak, however,
because the Minnesota public schools generally do not charge for tuition. Id. at 3072 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, J.J., dissenting). The primary incidence of the benefits
of the deduction, then, is enjoyed by parents who send their children to tuition-charging private
schools. The Minnesota scheme, therefore, is difficult to distinguish from the program invalidated
in Nyquist. Id.
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neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is
not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause," may
provide an avenue of escape from the inconsistent precedents that
constitute the court's state-aid-to-education establishment clause
jurisprudence.'
This article is in part a defense of Mueller. The result of the case
and its rationale may provide the means to synthesize Supreme Court
doctrines concerning religious activities in public schools with doctrines dealing with state aid to religious educational institutions.
Mueller, however, is used mainly as a point of departure for a more
general analysis of the validity of religious exercises in the public
schools and of state aid to private, sectarian schools that attempts
to derive principles from the former inquiry to govern the latter. If
rules exist to regulate the kind of religious activity that the state can
allow in its public schools, those same rules also should govern efforts
by the state to provide funding to its nonpublic schools. For this to
be true, the aid that a state provides to public school children in the
form of buildings, materials, and personnel must be converted conceptually into tax dollars spent generally on education. The form in
which the state distributes its largesse should not compel a difference
in constitutional outcomes.
I will initially propose a test for assessing the validity of state aid
to sectarian institutions. I will then analyze public school prayer cases,
demonstrating how the results in those cases lead to the proposed
test for!the state aid cases. This analysis will indicate that the primary
problem addressed by the public school cases is the use of state power
to promote particular religious messages to the exclusion of other
religious or nonreligious messages. I will devote particular attention

4. Mueller, 103 S.Ct. at 3069. A state may loan textbooks to children in nonpublic schools.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-62 (1975);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). But it may not loan instructional materials
directly to nonpublic schools or to children enrolled in such schools. Wolman, 433 U.S. at
238-41; Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-66. A state, however, can make standardized testing and scoring

services available to nonpublic schools. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 238-41. Moreover, it may reimburse nonpublic schools for administering such tests. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). Direct money grants for maintenance, however, are
prohibited. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-80
(1973). A state is prohibited from providing "auxiliary services" (counseling, testing, speech
and hearing therapy, and psychological services) on nonpublic school premises. Meek, 421 U.S.

at 367-72. But the provision of similar services to nonpublic school children away from the
school campus is permitted. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244-48. Diagnostic health services may be

offered either on or off campus. Id. at 241-42. Finally, a state may fund the transportation
of nonpublic school children to and from school. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
But it may not provide transportation for field trips. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55.
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to the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent5 to show that
no establishment problem is presented when the state merely makes
facilities available to all student groups without regard to the religious
content of their activities. I will examine next the implications of the
proposed test with respect to the tripartite analysis applied by the

Court to establishment clause questions presented in the context of
state aid to sectarian schools.6 After briefly examining the requirement that such statutes "must have a secular legislative purpose,"'
I will assert that the sweeping redefinition in Mueller of the "effect"
test' comports with the analysis advanced earlier. Finally, I will suggest

that the final requirement of the court, that such a statute "must
not foster an excessive entanglement with religion, ' 9 adds little to
the analysis and should be discarded. I begin with a proposed test
to assess the validity of state aid to sectarian educational institutions.

I.

A

PROPOSED ESTABLISHVIENT CLAUSE TEST

The test for assessing the validity of state efforts to aid sectarian
schools should be as follows: To the extent that the state funds public
educational institutions, the state should be permitted to assist nonpublic schools, including sectarian institutions, as long as the state
does not discriminate among the recipients of its assistance on the
basis of the religious content (or lack of religious content) of the recipients' educational programs.
At a superficial level, this test resembles the following establishment test proposed by Professor Choper: "[G]overnment financial
aid may be extended directly or indirectly to support parochial schools
without violation of the establishment clause so long as such aid does
not exceed the value of the secular educational service rendered by
the school.""0 Choper's test, however, stresses the dual secular and
religious character of sectarian education and proposes that the state
may fund only the secular aspect." This emphasis is similar to the

5. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The Court invalidated a state university policy of excluding religious
groups from the university open forum policy notwithstanding an assertion by the university
that including such groups would violate the establishment clause.
6. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
7. Id.
8. The statute's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits

religion." Id.
9. Id.
10. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CAss. L. Rv.
260, 265-66 (1968).

11. Choper observed that "[p]arochial schools perform a dual function, providing some
religious education and some secular education. Government may finance the latter, but the
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attempts by some of the Justices to draw a distinction between permissible general welfare legislation that benefits religious schools and
impermissible direct aid to the educational mission of those schools."2
In contrast, my proposed test suggests that government aid may
be extended uniformly to all schools regardless of the religious or
nonreligious character of their activities or educational programs. That
sectarian education has both religious and secular characteristics is
of no particular importance, and the test does not purport to isolate
and focus on the secular aspect of sectarian education.' 3 In this sense,
the proposed test closely corresponds to the neutrality or "religionblindedness" principle expounded by Professor Kurland[T]he proper construction of the religion clauses of the first amendment is that the freedom and separation clauses should be read as

establishment clause forbids it to finance the former." Id. at 284 (footnote omitted). Choper
then elaborated on why the state may legitimately finance the secular aspect of parochial school
education:
[B]y using tax funds to support the secular aspects of parochial education, the state
expends no more than would be required either to support parochial school pupils
if they attended existing public schools, or to establish additional public schools at
various sites for all pupils presently attending parochial schools, neither of which
alternatives raises colorable constitutional objection.
Id. (footnote omitted).
12. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 259 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Black, dissenting in Board of Educ. v. Allen, distinguished
the loan of textbooks upheld in that case from the bus transportation program upheld in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947):
The First Amendment's bar to establishment of religion must preclude a state from
using funds levied from all of its citizens to purchase books for use by sectarian
schools, which although "secular," realistically will in some way inevitably tend to
propagate the religious views of the favored sect. Books are the most essential tool
of education since they contain the resources of knowledge which the educational
process is designed to exploit. In this sense, it is not difficult to distinguish books,
which are the heart of any school, from bus fares, which provide a convenient and
helpful general public transportation service.
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas,
also dissenting in Allen, stated:
Whatever may be said of Everson, there is nothing ideological about a bus. There
is nothing ideological about a school lunch, or a public nurse, or a scholarship. The
textbook goes to the very heart of education in a parochial school. It is the chief,
although not solitary, instrumentality for propagating a particular religious creed or
faith.
Id. at 257. For criticism of attempts to separate the secular and the religious functions of
sectarian education, see infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
13. In practice, however, both Choper's test and my proposed test attain similar results.
Both tests view the amount expended by the public schools as a neutral benchmark against
which to assess the validity of state aid to nonpublic schools. See Choper, supra note 10, at
288. Where the education costs are the same, paying a parochial school the same amount it
costs to educate a child in the public school would be valid. Id. Moreover, although one would
expect Choper to advocate that the subsidy should be limited to the actual cost of a secular
education when that cost is lower in the parochial school than in the public school, he suggests
that paying the full amount that education costs in the public school would not violate the
establishment clause. Id.
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a single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a stan-

dard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden.'
Like the test suggested here, the Kurland principle would allow the
government to finance the entire operational costs of all state-accredited
educational institutions, including those controlled by a religious
organization, because the classification-state-accredited educational
institutions, which includes most ordinary parochial schools-is not
in the religious terms that his doctrine forbids.'"
This approach is the most desirable. As I will indicate next, the
chief problem presented in establishment clause cases arising in the
public school context inheres in the state placing its imprimatur upon
a particular religious belief or observance, or a restricted selection
of religious beliefs or observances, to the detriment of other religious
or nonreligious messages. This problem is eliminated when the state
provides funding or assistance universally without regard to the
religious or nonreligious content of its beneficiaries' activities.
II.

RELiGioUs EXERcIsEs IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

I will now assess the constitutionality of religious exercises in public
schools. Initially, I will examine the school prayer and released time
decisions, concluding that these cases prohibit only affirmative promotion of prayer or religious activity by the government. The problem
of government sponsorship of religion does not exist when the state
makes facilities or funds available to all groups, without discriminating
among recipients; government thereby permits religious activity without
sanctioning any particular religious beliefs. I will test this hypothesis
in two separate contexts: (1) the observance of a moment of silence
at the start of the public school day, and (2) the use of public school
facilities as a limited public forum available to religious and
nonreligious groups. But first, I will consider the Supreme Court decisions concerning school prayer and released time.
A.

The School Prayer and Released Time Cases

In a pair of cases twenty years ago, the Supreme Court invalidated
state-required recitation of prayers at the beginning of class in public
14. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. R-v. 1, 5 (1961).
15. Choper, supra note 10, at 270. For criticism of the Kurland rule, see id. at 271 (A
shortcoming of [Professor Kurland's] approach is that it permits the employment of taxraised funds for strictly religious purposes).
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schools. The first case, Engel v. Vitale, 6 held unconstitutional the
practice of reciting prayers composed by school officials and read

by public school students at the start of each day.' 7 The second decision, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 8 dispelled

any notion that the constitutional defect in Engel was that state officials
actually had composed the prayer. Schempp invalidated the reading
of passages from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer

at the beginning of each school day.
In both cases, the Court firmly asserted that no showing of govern-

ment coercion need exist to find a violation of the establishment
clause.' 9 This broad conclusion, however, was not necessary to either
decision. 20 When presented with religious exercises in public schools,
students face a strong, but subtle, pressure to conform, 2' and the cases
could have been more discretely decided on the grounds that compulsion did exist; that a showing of actual compulsion was unnecessary
because of the 'indirect coercive pressure' that [these programs] exerted; that the program[s] would result either in the young children
of the minority groups involved taking part in a religious exercise
that was contrary to their conscientious beliefs or in their being singled
out as 'oddballs' by their peers...

22

16. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
17. The "Regent's Prayer" was exceedingly nondenominational:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country.
Id. at 422.
18. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
19. "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals
or not." Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. "[A] violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on
coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended." Schempp, 374
U.S. at 223.
20. See Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47
MwN. L. Rav. 329, 342-43 (1963).
21. See id. at 343-46.
22. Id. at 342-43 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 431). The Court's insistence that the school
prayer programs could not be saved from invalidation even if children were excused from participating confirms its assertion that coercion is unnecessary for an establishment clause violation. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224-25 ("Nor are these required exercises mitigated by
the fact that individual students may absent themselves upon parental request, for the fact
furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause.") Requiring
a dissenter consciously to excuse himself, however, is itself coercive. Certainly, children faced
with such a choice run the risk of "being singled out as 'oddballs' by their peers." Choper,
supra note 20, at 343. Professor Chopers test for assessing the validity of religious exercises
in public schools also stresses coercion:
[Flor problems concerning religious intrusion in the public schools, the establishment
clause of the first amendment is violated when the state engages in what may be
fairly characterized as solely religiousactivity that is likely to result in (1) compromising
the student's religious or conscientious beliefs or (2) influencing the student's freedom
of religious or conscientious choice.
Choper, supra note 20, at 330.
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Indeed, the Justices recognized the coercive nature of the school prayer
programs they invalidated. In his majority opinion in Engel, Justice
Black wrote,
This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such
individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the pre3
vailing officially approved religion is plain.1
Moreover, in their concurring opinion in Schempp, Justices Goldberg
and Harlan made a similar observation:
The pervasive religiosity and direct governmental involvement inhering
in the prescription of prayer and Bible reading in the public schools,
during and as part of the curricular day, involving young impressionable children whose school attendance is statutorily compelled,
and utilizing the prestige, power, and influence of school
administration, staff, and authority, cannot realistically be termed
simply accommodation, and must fall within the interdiction of the
first amendment. 4
The conclusion that school prayer programs are inherently coercive
may well be inevitable. Prayer in public schools is an example of
direct and active government involvement in and sponsorship of particular religious views to the detriment of other religious and
nonreligious beliefs. 25 In this light,
[T]he decisions in Engel and Schempp exclude neither religion nor
prayer from the public schools, but only officially sanctioned religious
activity. They prohibit not religion but government's affirmative promotion of prayer and its direct and active involvement in religious
23. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31.
24. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 307 (Goldberg & Harlan, J.J., concurring). Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Schempp also suggests the importance of the coercive effect of required
school prayers, although it does so somewhat obliquely. Brennan distinguished the holdings
in Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1935), which upheld state power
to compel military exercises at a state university against students' asserted religious convictions,
and West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which denied state power to
expel students for their refusal to observe the flag salute ceremony, because of the presence
of voluntarism in one and coercion in the other: "Far more significant is the fact that Hamilton
dealt with the voluntary attendance at college of young adults, while Barnette involved the
compelled attendance of young children at elementary and secondary schools. This distinction
warrants a difference in constitutional results." 374 U.S. at 252-53 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25 .Unlike other establish clause questions, the school prayer issue does not involve
the mere neutral provision of wholly secular government services, such as fire and
police protection, to both religious and secular institutions. Nor does it involve the
mere neutral and essentially passive acquiescence of government in the conduct of
both religious and secular activities on government property.... Rather government
sponsored prayer in the public schools involves direct and active government involvement in the encouragement and structuring of perhaps the most basic form of religious
activity-prayer itself.
Stone, In Opposition to the School PrayerAmendment, 50 U. Ci. L. REv. 823, 827 (1983).
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expression .... Engel and Schempp leave ample room for religion
in the school environment."
Defining the contours of permissible religious activity in the public
school classroom requires the construction of a line that separates
state-sanctionedfrom state-permittedreligious activity.27 In turn, this
line depends on neutrality or uniformity. In other words, the state,
in structuring its public school curriculum or in making available some
sort of assistance, must make no distinctions on the basis of religious
content.2 8 Before examining two possible areas of permissible religious
activity in the public schools, the moment of silence legislation and
the use of school facilities as public fora, a brief discursive into the
released time cases decided by the Supreme Court is in order. The
focus on state coercion and official sanction suggested here may provide an explanation for the contradictory results in those cases.
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,2 9 the Court
struck down an Illinois released time program in which the state permitted religious teachers employed by private religious groups to come
into public school buildings during school hours to lead classes in
religious instruction. Pupils were released from their regular classes
to attend the religious classes; students who did not attend were required to pursue their secular studies in other classrooms." Justice
Black, writing for the Court, stressed the coercive nature of the
program:
The operation of the State's compulsory education system thus assists
and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried
on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to
school for secular education are released in part from their legal
duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This
is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and taxpublic school system to aid religious groups to spread their
supported
3'
faith.
Four years later, however, in Zorach v. Clauson, " the Court upheld
26. Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
27. Loewy, School Prayer, Neutrality, and the Open Forum: Why We Don't Need a Constitutional Amendment, 61 N.C.L. REv. 141, 143 (1982).
28. Id. (the key is neutrality); see Kurland, supra note 14, at 5; supra text accompanying
note 14.
29. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
30. Id. at 204, 207.
31. Id. at 209. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in McCollum, stated that "the public school
system of Champaign actively furthers inculcation in the religious tenets of some faiths, and
in the process sharpens the consciousness of religious differences at least among some of the
children committed to its care." Id. at 228; see also Choper, supra note 20, at 353 ("The
McCollum decision can only be accounted for on the ground that the operation of the released
time program-a program having no independent primary secular goal-resulted in compromising
the conscientious beliefs of the complainant's child.").
32. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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a New York program that permitted public schools to release students
during the school day for off-campus religious instruction. Once again,

students who were not released to stay in the
the state required
33
classroom.
Although adopting Justice Douglas' proffered distinction that Zorach

involved "neither religious instruction in public school classrooms nor
the expenditure of public funds"

and was "therefore

unlike

McCollum" 3 4 is tempting, the cases can be distinguished by the degree

of state coercion involved in each. 35 By requiring the religious classes

to be held away from public school grounds, the state action with
respect to religious instruction did not have the same coercive character,
or the same offensive state seal of approval, that condemned the

released time program in McCollum. Indeed, requiring the students
to leave for religious instruction seems indicative of state disdain for,

rather than approval of, religious education.
Upon reflection, however, this argument is less than compelling.

While the practice upheld in Zorach may have been less coercive than
the practice invalidated in McCollum, 36 the fact remains that the state
used "the compelled classroom hours of its compulsory school
machinery so as to channel children into sectarian classes." 3 A state
decision to release all children, so that some could attend religious

classes while the rest could pursue whatever activities they wished,
religious or nonreligious, would be sufficiently neutral and would not
offend the establishment clause. 38 A plan that releases only students
33. Id. at 308.
34. Id. at 308-09.
35. [I]t is inaccurate to contend that the Zorach Court distinguished McCollum on the
ground that "public ... funds were not used in New York." Rather, the Court
stressed that in McCollum "the force of the public school was used to promote
[religious] instruction," whereas the Court found this not to be so in New York.
Choper, supra note 10, at 307 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308-09). The Schempp court also
distinguished Zorach:
These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who
are required by law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under
the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools.
None of these factors, other than compulsory school attendance, was present in the
program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson.
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
36. Justice Douglas concluded that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that
the state coerced children to take religious classes. "If in fact coercion were used . . . a wholly
different case would be presented." Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311; see also id. at 321 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("coercion in the abstract is acknowledged to be fatal").
37. Id. at 317 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 230-31 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Champaign might
have drawn upon the French system, known in its American manifestation as 'dismissed time,'
whereby one school day is shortened to allow all children to go where they please, leaving
those who so desire to go to a religious school. The momentum of the whole school atmosphere
and school planning is presumably put behind religious instruction, as given in Champaign,
precisely in order to secure for the religious instruction such momentum and planning").
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who are prepared to attend particular religious classes in lieu of com-

pelled secular education would be unconstitutional.39 In accordance
with the coercion and official sanction concerns and the neutrality
of unformity principles asserted thus far, Zorach was decided
wrongly." °
B.

A Moment of Silence

One way in which a state may be able to permit religious activity
in public schools without placing its imprimatur upon a particular
religious viewpoint in opposition to other religious beliefs, or upon
religion in opposition to nonreligion, is the observance of a moment
of silence at the start of each school day.4 ' Arguably, this practice
possesses the requisite neutrality because students are free to think.
what they wish. A moment of silence should be constitutional even
if some students use it to reflect on their religious beliefs or to pray.42
Unfortunately, the case law is mixed. Courts that have considered
the issue have split as to the propriety of observing a moment of
silence.43

39. There is all the difference in the world between letting the children out of school
and letting some of them out of school into religious classes. . . .The pith of the
case is that formalized religious instruction is substituted for other school activity
which those who do not participate in the released-time program are compelled to
attend.
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 320-21 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson, dissenting in Zorach
argued that "[tihe distinction attempted between [McCollum and Zorrach] is trivial, almost
to the point of cynicism, magnifying its nonessential details and disparaging compulsion which
was the underlying reason for invalidity.'" Id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
40. See Choper, supra note 20, at 363 ("Because of the presence of inherent coercion,
it seems that Zorach was incorrectly decided .... ).
41. Stone argues that a minute of silence at the beginning of the school day is a reasonable
accommodation of religion. Stone, supra note 25, at 844-45; cf. Loewy, supra note 27, at
143. (Allowing different students to begin class with a philosophical statement of their own
choosing, each student being allowed to speak or the speaker of the day being chosen at random, without regard to the content of his message, constitutes valid state-permitted prayer
not invalid state-sanctioned prayer.)
42. Cf. Loewy, supra note 27, at 153 ("The establishment clause prohibits the state from
favoring theistic prayers over other philosophical utterances; it does not prohibit individuals
from choosing theistic prayers.").
43. Courts upholding the practice appear to be in the minority. See Gaines v. Anderson,
421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976); cf. Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich.
1965) (upholding practice of permitting student-initiated prayer at the beginning of the school
day but before the beginning of classes). Several recent opinions have invalidated moment of
silence statutes; See Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1707 (1984); May v. Cooperman, 571 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983); Duffy v. Las Cruces
Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983); cf. Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th
Cir. 1981) (invalidating statute authorizing voluntary student and teacher prayers in public schools,
notwithstanding that no student or teacher was compelled to pray), aff'd mem., 455 U.S. 93
(1982); Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 863 (1981) (permitting student council to recite prayers and bible verses at student
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I will make no effort, however, to settle the issue. For purposes
of my argument, showing that the division among the courts centers

on whether a moment of silence is in fact neutral and not on whether
a neutral accommodation is itself violative of the establishment clause

is sufficient.
Gaines v. Anderson" held that a Massachusetts statute requiring

the observance of a period of silence for prayer or meditation at the
start of the school day did not violate the establishment clause. After
noting that the effect of the statute was to allow students to use the
period of silence as they wished, " the court analyzed the legislative
purpose and upheld the statute on principles closely corresponding

to the neutrality principles advanced earlier:
We think that the lack of any mandatory direction to students to
meditate or pray clearly indicates a legislative purpose to maintain
neutrality .... The fact that the ...program provides an opportunity for prayer to those students who desire to pray during the6
period of silence does not render the program unconstitutional.1
Subsequent courts that have reached the opposite result disagreed
with Gaines on two points. First, the legislative purposes of the statutes
at issue were analyzed, and in each case, the court found the purpose

to be religious and, therefore, impermissible.' Second and much more
important, the courts doubted whether observing a moment of silence

was in fact neutral and concluded that requiring such observances
"implies recognition of religious activities. . . as an integral part of
the [School] District's program . . . . 4 This expression of doubt

assemblies during school hours violated the establishment clause despite the fact that attendance at the assemblies was voluntary).
44. 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976).
45. The effect of the statute "is to accommodate students who desire to use the minute
of silence for prayer or religious meditation, and also other students who prefer to reflect
upon secular matters." Id. at 343.
46. Id. at 344.
47. See May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1573 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Both the history
of this kind of legislation and the circumstances of the adoption of this particular Bill point
inescapably to an essentially religious purpose."); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F.
Supp. 1013, 1015, 1019 (D.N.M. 1983) (finds clear purpose to establish a devotional exercise
in the public schools). One commentator has suggested that a religious purpose may be divined
from the almost univeysal passage of such statutes only after the Supreme Court invalidated
school prayer statutes. See Note, The Unconstitutionalityof State Statutes Authorizing Moments
of Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARv. L. Rav. 1874, 1880 (1983). But see Gaines, 421
F. Supp. at 341 (the timing of the enactment of moment of silence legislation, in the aftermath
of the prayer cases, would not, of itself, establish an impermissible purpose to advance religion).
I do not suggest that inquiring into legislative purpose is inappropriate or advocate any change
in the purpose prong of the Supreme Court's tripartite establishment test. See Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. Therefore, to consider
the issue further in this article is unnecessary.
48. Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (D.N.M. 1983) (quoting
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as to the neutrality of the legislation leaves intact the premise of the
decision in Gaines that the neutral provision of assistance by the state
to all forms of expression in the public school context does not violate
the establishment clause, even if some students take the opportunity
to turn that assistance to religious uses.
Whether such laws are merely neutral accommodations of religious
and nonreligious beliefs, and therefore constitutionally permissible,
or whether the moment of silence creates enough of a religious
impression to advance religion impermissibly remains unsettled. But
at least the courts on both sides of the issue are asking the right question: Is the challenged practice a truly neutral benefit extended to
all groups, or does the state in fact place its imprimatur upon religion?
I will consider next a situation in which courts have concluded that
neutral assistance by the state to all viewpoints, whether religious or
nonreligious, does not offend the establishment clause: the use of public
school facilities are used as a limited public forum.
C. Public Fora and Public Schools
In terms of the neutrality or uniformity principles thus far expressed,
a state should be able to make public school facilities available to
all student groups to hold meetings, conduct activities, or observe
ceremonies, even if particular groups use those facilities for religious

Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir.
1982)). The court in Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), made a similar

observation:
Unavoidably, students will understand that they are being encouraged not only to
be silent, but also to engage in religious exercises. It cannot be seriously argued,
and certainly cannot be assured, that nice distinctions concerning the potential mean-

ings of "meditation" and "personal beliefs" will naturally arise in the minds of
public school students.
Id. at 1165; see also Note, supra note 47, at 1888 ("The use of compulsory attendance laws

to compel student presence during a moment of silence gives the impression of state support

of religion ....
If the students perceive the moment of silence as a religious exercise in the
public school ... the effect of the statute will be to advance religion").

The Duffy court raised the possibility of excessive entanglement between church and state as
an additional reason to invalidate the statute. Duffy, 557 F. Supp. at 1021. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), however, the Supreme Court concluded tht payment of salary
supplements to parochial school teachers fostered excessive entanglement. Duffy incorrectly
applied this argument to state supervision of public school teachers. The supervision by the
state of its own employees creates no entanglement problems. Note, supra note 47, at 1893

n.l10. For this reason, entanglement is not likely to be a decisive factor in the moment of
silence context. Id. at 1893. But cf. May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1575 (D.N.J.
1983) ("Implementation of the [moment of silence] Bill would not involve the State in the
kind of continued and pervasive monitoring of sectarian activities which was condemned in

Lemon v. Kurtzman . . . . It would, however, tend to promote divisiveness among and between religious groups, another form of entanglement.").
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meetings, religious observances, or prayers.49 When students voluntarily originate religious exercises in response to a school policy that
encourages all kinds of student organizations to meet on school
property, any constitutional objections to religious activities on public
school grounds should be avoided. 0 These meetings "do not entail
the appearance of state sponsorship, the transfer of public funds in
support of religious activity, or active state promotion or participation in religious exercises."'" The constitutional protection inheres in
the required neutrality or uniformity of state allocation of facilities.
As long as accessibility is nonideological, the establishment clause
should not require the state to forbid the use. of state facilities for
prayer or for religious meetings.5 2
The earliest cases to reach the issue, however, decided against the
validity of allowing student use of public school classrooms for prayer
sessions or for religious meetings as part of a more general program
that made classrooms available to a variety of student organizations. 53
Although each court found that the challenged practice had a secular
purpose,"4 each concerned itself primarily with the symbolic effect
of allowing student religious use of public school classrooms. For
example, the court in Brandon v. Board of Education5 5 concluded
49. Loewy, supra note 27, at 143 (By making classrooms available before or after school
or during recess to any group of students, the state permits but does not sanction school prayer).
50. Note, The Constitutionalityof Student-InitiatedReligious Meetings on Public School
Grounds, 50 U. CN. L. Rav. 740, 785 (1981).
51. Id.
52. Loewy, supra note 27, at 143.
53. See, e.g., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1981) (upheld, against
students' free exercise claims, a school board's refusal to permit communal prayer meetings
on school premises on strength of the boards contention that granting the students' request
would violate the establishment clause), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982); Johnson v. Huntington
Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (permitting
bible study club to meet and conduct its activities on the school campus during the school
day was prohibited by the establishment clause), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Trietly v.
Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (upheld school board
refusal to perrinit formation of bible clubs in public high schools as the proposed club meetings
would violate the establishment clause).
54. See, e.g., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1981) ("A neutral
policy granting all student groups, including religious organizations, access to school facilities
reflects a secular, and clearly permissible purpose-the encouragement of extracurricular
activities."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High
School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (Permitting "student organizations
to conduct their activities on school campuses during the school day in accordance with district
rules and regulations is in the abstract secular in nature.") cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
Both Brandon and Johnson found excessive entanglement in the official supervision of the
school's secular schedule, maintenance, and safety and in the need for official supervision of
the students' activities to make sure that participation was voluntary and that membership was
nondiscriminatory. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979; Johnson, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 137 Cal. Rptr.
at 50. The Johnson court also noted the danger of political divisiveness in allowing the formation
of religious clubs. Id. at 14-15, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
55. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982).
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that permitting prayer meetings would create an improper appearance
of official support, violating the constitutional prohibition against
impermissible advancement of religion. 6 The court noted that "[t]o
an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of secular
involvement in religious activities might indicate that the state has
placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This symbolic
effect is too dangerous to permit."" Moreover, the court in Johnson
v. Huntington Beach Union High School District" found the impermissible symbolic effect in the fact that the school board rules at
issue would render the Bible club seeking student club status an entity
"sponsored by the school." 9 To the Johnson court, therefore, placing
the support and sponsorship of the school behind the club and making
its activities part of the school's extracurricular program impermissibly
60
placed the imprimatur of the state on the club's activities.
Both Brandon and Johnson were correct in focusing on whether
the state "placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed." But
their conclusion that the state is associated symbolically with student
use of classrooms for religious purposes is flawed. Unlike the prayer
cases, 61 no direct state action mandates or promotes prayer. 62 The
practice ought to be upheld.
The issue may have been settled, however, by the Supreme Court
decision in Widmar v. Vincent. 63 In that case, the Court invalidated

56.

Id. at 978-79. The court further concluded in dicta that this improper symbolic effect

was not present when the connection between the asserted benefit to religious groups and the
core educational mission of the school became more attenuated. See id. at 978-79 ("the semblance
of official support is less evident where a school building is used at night as a temporary facility

by religious organizations, under a program that grants access to all charitable groups.") (citing
Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978)) (per-

mitting religious groups to rent public school facilities at a rate reflecting the cost incurred
by the school board did not violate the establishment clause); id. at 979 ("where a clergyman

briefly appears at a yearly high school graduation ceremony no image of official state approval
is created.") (citing Wood v. Mount Lebanon Township School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D.
Pa. 1972)).

57. Id. at 978; see also Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 13, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 ("The 'primary effect' test bespeaks not only of financial

assistance but also necessarily inquired whether the consequence of state action is to place its
imprimatur upon the religious activity.... This aspect of the effect test reaches the essence
of the Establishment Clause proscription."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).

58. 68 Cal. App. 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
59. Id. at 13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
62. Note, supra note 50, at 768-69.
63. 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see 66 MAuq. L. Ray. 178, 192 (1982) (concluding that Widmar
may signal a willingness by the present Court to reconsider the question of religious activities
in all public schools and that the case provides a strong basis for attacking lower court decisions that have prohibited student-initiated religious activities in public secondary schools).
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a state university policy of excluding religious groups from an open
forum policy that made university facilities available for activities of
registered student groups. Widmar held that the free speech clause
invalidated the university's exclusionary policy." The case is of particular interest, however, because the Court dwelled on the validity
of the open forum policy under the establishment clause." While the
Court agreed with the university that preventing establishment clause
violations constituted a compelling state interest, it observed that "it
does not follow . . .that an 'equal access' policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases." 66 Because all
the parties conceded that the open forum policy had a valid secular
purpose and did not risk excessive entanglement between church and
state,67 the Court concentrated on the effect of allowing religious

64. Interestingly, the Court elected to rest on the free speech guarantee of the first amendment rather than the free exercise clause. See id. at 269 n.6 (argues that religious speech is
entitled to constitutional protection). But see id. at 286-87 nn.4-5 (White, J., dissenting) (doubts
whether a public forum must be open to regular religious speech simply because it is open
to all kinds of speech). Courts repeatedly have rebuffed the claims of student religious groups
that denial of equal treatment with other student groups amounts to a denial of free exercise
rights. See, e.g., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (school board refusal
to permit communal prayer meetings on school premises did not limit the free exercise rights
of members of a student prayer group), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982); Hunt v. Board
of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.W. Va. 1971) (school board prohibition of use of school
buildings for any religious activities did not deny public school students their free speech, freedom
of assembly, or free exercise rights). Widmar did nothing to change this. See Bender v.
Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (school district refusal
to allow a student-initiated prayer club to meet during an activity period established to encourage
students to organize clubs and groups violated students' free speech rights, but did not violate
their free exercise rights); infra note 80 and accompanying text.
Focusing on students' free speech rights, however, is particularly appropriate in the context
of student access to public school facilities. Allowing students to form whatever clubs they
please, whether religious or nonreligious, as long as the state neither advantages or disparages
particular groups because of the religious content of their activities, .is
one way to implement
the admonition of Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) that schools should
not be "'enclaves of totalitarianism,' but places where 'leaders [are] trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues [rather]
than through any kind of authoritative selection."' Loewy, supra note 27, at 156 (quoting
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511-12).
65. In defending its policy, the university claimed a "compelling interest in maintaining
strict separation of church and state," an interest it derived from the establishment clause.
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
66. Id.at 271.
67. Id. at 271-72. As to the purpose of the policy, the Court made the following revealing
observation in rebutting the university's contention that using its rooms for religious speech
would undermine its secular aim of providing a student forum:
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to student groups,
it differs from those cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting
school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups but not by others.
*.. In those cases, the school may appear to sponsor the views of the speaker.
Id. at 275 n.10 (citation omitted). As to entanglement, the Court stated: "[T]he University
would risk greater entanglement by attempting to enforce its exclusion of 'religious worship
and religious speech' than by having an open forum policy." Id. at 271 n.10.
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groups to use such a forum. The primary effect, the Court concluded,
would not be the advancement of religion: "[W]e are unpersuaded
that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of
disclosure, would be to advance religion. .

.

. An open forum in a

public university does not confer any imprimatur of State approval
on religious sects or practices".68

Before courts can apply this rationale to public schools, one obstacle
must be overcome. Widmar involved college students, not public school
children. Arguably, this age difference could lead to a difference in
constitutional outcome, because younger, more impressionable public
school children are entitled to heightened protection. 9 Widmar did
not foreclose this possibility: "University students are, of course, young
adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should
be able to appreciate that the university's policy is one of neutrality
' '7
toward religion. 0
Some courts have seized on this opening to invalidate school policies
that permit student religious groups to use public school facilities on
the same terms as other student groups. For example, in Lubbock
Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School District 7' the
Fifth Circuit held that a school district policy permitting students to
gather at school with supervision either before or after school hours
to meet voluntarily for "educational, moral, religious, or ethical purposes" violated the establishment clause. Citing the Widmar distinction between university students and younger children, the Lubbock
court concluded that the implicit approval by the school district of
extracurricular religious meetings, "in combination with the impressionability of secondary and primary age school children and the
possibility that they would misapprehend the involvement of the
68.

Id. at 273-74 (emphasis added). This language will be addressed further in the next

section, which proposes that the question whether state aid to a sectarian school in a particular
instance confers the "imprimatur of state approval" on religious acts or practices should become
the core of the Supreme Court's primary effect test. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying
text.
The Court also apparently relied on the fact that no evidence existed that religious groups
would dominate the forum: "Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious
as well as religious speakers. At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups
will dominate [the] open forum ... the advancement of religion would not be the forum's
primary effect." Id. at 274-75. This also will be addressed in the next section. See infra notes
115-19 and accompanying text.
69. "The potential effect of Widmar on the permissible role of student religious organizations in public schools is unclear. While the Court may extend it full force, universities do
not share 'the special place of public schools in American life' and university students are
less impressionable than their younger counterparts." Stone, supra note 25, at 846-47 (quoting
L. TRIBE, AmamcAN CONSnTuTONAL LAW 14-5, at 825 (1978)).
70.
71.

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n.13.
669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
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[d]istrict in these meetings, renders the primary effect of the policy
impermissible advancement of religion." 2
Widmar uses its conclsuion that younger students are more impressionable than their older counterparts in a way that is at variance
with earlier establishment clause cases. Tilton v. Richardson73 raised
the fact that college students are "les impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination because it reduced the need for
entangling state supervision to make sure that the buildings at issue
were not used to further religious indoctrination." 7 In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 75 the Court employed the same reasoning to reach an
opposite conclusion that with younger, more impressionable children,
the need for entangling supervision is heightened.76 Against this
background, the Widmar application of the concept of
impressionability-thatis, susceptibility to outside influences appears
misplaced in the open forum context. 77 The danger posed in the public
forum is not the risk of state-promoted religious indoctrination; the
state supplies no messages, religious or otherwise, for presentation
in its forum, but instead makes available facilities to everyone. Rather,
the danger is the more subtle risk that students will misperceive the
role of the state and conclude that the state in fact approves of some
or all of the religious activities that take place in its forum. The contention that public school students are more likely than college students
to conclude that the state tacitly endorses religious activity when it
creates a public forum available to everyone is difficult at best. Such
a perception is far more likely when the state directly and overtly
uses its facilities and coercive powers to further one religion at the
expense of others or of nonreligion. Students most likely will perceive
an endorsement of religion if the state requires school prayer in
classrooms or extends benefits only to the adherents of certain religious
tenets to the exclusion of all others.
Only one court has recognized that the problem is one of perception rather than of impressionability. Bender v. Williamsport Area

72. Id. at 1045-46. The court also concluded that the purpose of the school district policy,
"ostensibly designed to allow many groups to meet," was, "when examined in the context
of the total school policy, more clearly designed to allow the meetings of religious groups."
Id. at 1044-45. Moreover, the "use of the District's facilities and its continuing supervision
of the religious meetings create the entanglement which leads to an impermissible establishment
of religion." Id. at 1046.

73. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
74.
75.

Id. at 686.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

76. Id.at 618-19.
77. Note, supra note 50, at 769 n.173.
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School District" invalidated a school district refusal to allow a studentinitiated prayer club to meet during an activity period established to
encourage students to organize clubs 79 because that refusal violated
the students' free speech rights. 8" Like Widmar, Bender focused on
whether allowing religious groups access to the activity period would
violate the establishment clause. The court noted that the activity period
"evinces an 'important index of secular effect' in that it is open to
a 'broad spectrum of student groups' and that "[g]iven the range
of interests accommodated by the activity period . . . like treatment

of [the prayer group] would confer a 'general benefit' upon it rather
than furthering its aims." 8 ' Consequently, the court concluded that
the open forum did not place the imprimatur of the state on religion
or on religious practices."2 To support-this conclusion, the court relied
on two grounds. First, the court asserted that high school students
were mature enough to perceive that the open forum did not constitute tacit state approval of religious activity.83 Second, the Bender
court recognized the importance of direct state action or state coercion in assessing whether the state has lent its approval to a particular religion:
Engel, Schempp, and McCollum involved religious activity not merely
allowed by the state but required by it .... Although the Supreme

Court has noted that the presence or absence of state coercion is
not dispositive in Establishment Clause cases, such a factor appears
important in gauging the likelihood that the government will be taken

to have placed its imprimatur on a given religious practice.
The lack of en masse activity together with the more varied alternatives reduces any perception of state approval or student
embarrassment. "'

The court therefore found that the use of the public school as a public
forum available to both religious and nonreligious groups did not
violate the establishment clause.
So far, I have interwoven the danger of officially-sanctioned religion
78. 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
79.. The students had requested permission to form a club and to meet during the activity
period on the same basis as other student groups. That request was denied. No other group
previously had been denied the same opportunity. Id. at 698-99.
80. The court observed that by implementing its activity period, the state had created a
limited public forum, like that in Widmar. Id. at 703-06. Therefore, "a content based decision
to exclude subject matter would require compelling state interest scrutiny." Id. at 706. The
court also held that the refusal of the district did not violate the students' free exercise rights
because it did not force students to forgo their religious belief in group worship. Id. at 701-03.
81. Id. at 711 (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274).
82. Id.at 712-13.
83. Id.at 712.
84. Id.at 713.
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and the concept of neutrality and have drawn the line delimiting statesanctioned and state-permitted religious activity. I first isolated the
direct action of the state to promote religious activity by lending the
weight of official sanction-the imprimatur of state approval-to particular religious practices or to religion itself as the predominant vice
in the school prayer and released time cases. As long as the state
makes no attempt to discriminate among its beneficiaries on the basis
of the religious content of their activities, the constitutional objection is eliminated when the state neutrally opens facilities to all who
wish to use them, permitting the expression of religious messages in
conjunction with all other messages. The threat of officially-sanctioned religion is dispelled when the challenged religious activity is
initiated voluntarily by students rather than imposed unilaterally by
the government. I then tested this argument in two contexts: (1) the
observance of a moment of silence in public classrooms, and (2) the
use of public schools as public fora. Although the legality of moment
of silence laws is unclear, courts on both sides of the issue have focused
correctly on whether such legislation is merely a neutral accommodation
of religious and nonreligious viewpoints or whether it represents tacit
state promotion of religious exercises in the public schools. As to the
public forum, the Widmar rationale that an open forum "does not
confer any imprimatur of State approval," when viewed in the abstract,
strongly supports the neutrality principles advanced here. Any remaining problems with impressionability or misperception are reduced in
the public aid cases considered in the next section. When the state
expands the contours of its subsidized "forum" beyond the confines
of the classroom to embrace its entire educational program, the
audience comprises parents who voluntarily initiate and choose between
the various educational opportunities made possible by state assistance.
These parents represent mature adults who resemble the college students
involved in Widmar, not the younger children who populate the public
school's open forum.
III.

STATE

-AID

TO PAROCHAL SCHOOLS

The United States Supreme Court has expanded establishment clause
jurisprudence beyond the confines of the public education system to
embrace state efforts to provide assistance to private parochial schools.
In so doing, the Court gradually has developed a three part test to
determine the validity of providing assistance to private parochial
schools. The Court first articulated an establishment clause test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, a case that invalidated a Rhode Island statute
providing a salary supplement to teachers at certain nonpublic schools
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and a Pennsylvania statute allowing school boards to "purchase secular

educational services" from nonpublic schools." The Lemon Court
stated: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;

second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 86

I now will examine each of the three prongs of the Lemon test
and suggest modifications to each prong to bring the test in conformance with the neutrality principles expounded in the first section
and derived from the previously discussed cases. This is a process
that the Court has begun with Mueller v. Allen.1 7 The process entails
drawing a distinction between state-sanctioned and state-permitted
religious activity. As with the problems discussed earlier, the key is
neutrality.
A.

Secular Legislative Purpose

Preventing governmental action for religious purposes, whether overt
or covert, is perhaps the central concern underlying the establishment
clause.8 8 The purpose test developed by the Court, however, is a
85. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
86. Id. at 612-13. The focus of the Court on purpose and effect was presaged by Justice
Clark's opinion in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963):
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of
the enactment? If either is the advancement of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of the legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to
say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222. The origins of the entanglement prong of the Lemon test can be found in Justice
Goldberg's and Justice Harlan's concurrence in Schempp: "[B]oth the required and the permissible accommodations between state and church frame the relation as one free of hostility
or favor and productive of religious and political harmony, but without undue involvement
of one in the concerns or practices of the other." Id. at 306 (Goldberg and Harlan, J.J.,
concurring).
In his concurring opinion in Schempp, Justice Brennan proposed an alternative test: "Equally
the Constitution enjoins those involvements of religion with secular institutions which (a) serve
the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government
for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental
ends where secular means would suffice." Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's test does not support the neutrality approach advanced here. The first two parts of the
test apparently would invalidate most of the state permitted religious activity discussed earlier.
See notes 42-84 supra and accompanying text. Observing a moment of silence at the start of
the public school day or allowing student religious groups to use public school facilities on
the same terms as other groups, arguably would both "serve the essentially religious activities
or religious institutions" and "employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes." The third part of Justice Brennan's test apparently would exclude almost any attempt
by the state to include parochial schools in its educational program. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 431.
87. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983); see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
88. See Choper, supra note 10, at 268-69 ("Government action for religious purposes
is highly suspect .... [G]overnmental action for secularpurposes does not fall within the core
of the establishment clause's concern ....").
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relatively tiny hurdle that can be overcome by asserting that the purpose of a particular educational program is the promotion of

education. 8 9 Indeed, the Court only once has invalidated a statute
because an impermissible religious purpose was found. In Stone v.

Graham, the Court struck down a Kentucky statute that required public
schools to post copies of the Ten Commandments on classroom walls. 90
The Court stated that "[t]he preeminent purpose for posting the Ten

Commandments is plainly religious in nature ....[A]nd no legislative
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact."'"
Unlike the schemes earlier discussed, the statute in Stone was not
a neutral provision that benefitted both religious and nonreligious

interests alike. Rather, Stone involved direct and active government
support of a particular religious message. The Court, therefore, was

correct to strike it down.
No modification of the purpose prong of the Lemon test is

necessary. State educational programs that stand up under the
neutrality test proposed in the first section may be premised on either
of two secular purposes. First, proponents of such programs may assert
that their goal is the promotion of education itself. This probably
will satisfy the various pronouncements by the Court on the secular

purpose requirement. 92 Second, proponents of including parochial
schools in some capacity as part of a -state educational program may

claim that their purpose is to promote diversity and a pluralistic society,
an argument made by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in

Walz v. Tax Commission.93 Indeed, this argument is more compelling
where the state provides benefits to a broad spectrum of groups that
include religious institutions than it was in Walz, where the state
89. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754 (1976) ("[Appellants
do not challenge the ... finding that the purpose of Maryland's aid program is the secular
one of supporting private higher education generally, as an economic alternative to a wholly
public one."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) ("[Ihe statutes themselves clearly
state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered
by the compulsory attendance laws .... [W]e find nothing here that undermines the stated
legislative intent; it must therefore be accorded appropriate deference."); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) ("The express purpose of [the statute] was ... the furtherance
of the educational opportunities available to the young.").
90. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
91. Id. at 41. In distinguishing various educational assistance programs, the Court stated
that "[s]uch assistance has the obvious legitimate secular purpose of promoting educational
opportunity. The posting of the Ten Commandments has no such secular purpose." Id. at 43 n.5.
92. See supra note 89.
93. [G]overnment grants exemptions to religious organizations because they uniquely
contribute to the pluralism of American society by their religious activities. Government
may properly include religious institutions among the variety of private nonprofit
groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group contributes to the diversity of
association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.
397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

. 399
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instituted a tax exemption that was specifically tailored to benefit
religious organizations. 94 Establishing a valid secular purpose, therefore,
is not a problem.
B.

Principal or Primary Effect that Neither
Advances nor Inhibits Religion

Despite a deceptively simple formulation, the primary-effect prong
of the Lemon test has proved difficult to apply. Several variations
have emerged. Justice Douglas, concurring in the Prayer Cases, suggested that any provision of state aid to religious organizations would
violate the establishment clause.95 This cannot be correct.9 6 Broadly
construed, a ban on any financial contribution by the state to religious
organizations would forbid the provision of police, fire, and other
governmental services to churches and parochial schools, practices that

are universally conceded to be valid.97
Justice Blackmun proposed a two part inquiry in assessing the
primary effect of a state subsidy to private colleges that was challenged

in Roemer v. Board of Public Works 98 "[Hunt v. McNair] requires
(1) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so 'pervasively

sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian
94. Walz involved a constitutional provision and an implementing statute that extended
"property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious
worship." Id. at 666. The program involved in Walz will receive greater attention in Section
C, which analyzes entanglement. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
95. Justice Douglas, concurring in Schempp, stated:
But the Establishment Clause is not limited to precluding the State itself from conducting religious exercises. It also forbids the State to employ its facilities or funds
in a way that gives any church, or all churches, greater strength in our society than
it would have by relying on its members alone.... Such contributions may not be
made by the State even in a minor degree without violating the Establishment Clause.
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1963) (Douglas, J., concuring) ("The
point for decision is whether the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise.")
96. "One fixed principle in this field is our consistent rejection of the argument that any
program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation violates the Establishment Clause." Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3065 (1983).
97. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947). The Court noted that
"Parents might be reluctant to permit their children to attend schools which the state had
cut off from such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks .... But such is obviously not the
purpose of the First Amendment." Id. Indeed, state financial support need not be a necessary
condition of an establishment clause violation. In Stone v. Graham, the Court invalidated a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms notwithstanding that private contributions provided the necessary funds. 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980). "It
does not matter that the posted copies . . . are financed by voluntary private contributions,
for the mere copies under the auspices of the legislature provides the 'official support of the
State ... Government' that the Establishment Clause prohibits." Id. (quoting School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
98. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they alone
may be funded." 99 This inquiry combines two analyses that various
members of the Court have applied to the question of state subsidies
to private schools and colleges. Sometimes, the Court has found an
impermissible effect because of the religious character of the aided
instructions. For example, in Meek v. Pittenger,'° the Court invalidated
a state-financed direct loan of instructional materials to nonpublic
schools because of the "religion-pervasive" character of the schools
involved; 750 of the beneficiaries of the loans were church-related
or religiously affiliated.' 01 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist
criticized the Court for "measuring the 'effect' of a law by the percentage of sectarian schools benefitted." 01 2 His dissent demonstrated the
perspectival nature of percentages. Relying on a proposition advanced
in the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the separate
laws authorizing aid to public and private schools should be read
together. Viewing the state educational program in its entirety, then
only a small percentage
students at religious schools would constitute
3
of the beneficiaries of state assistance."J
At other times, the Court has focused on the nature of the aid
granted and on whether the state is funding the secular or the religious
portion of the sectarian educational program. The Court's effort in
Wolman v. Walter"' to distinguish state-provided transportation to
and from school, which it had upheld in Everson v. Board of
Education,'"' from state-provided transportation for field trips, which
it intended to invalidate in Wolman, provides a particularly good
example of this kind of analysis:
The critical factors [in Everson] . . . are that the school has no
control over the expenditure of the funds and the effect of the
expenditure is unrelated to the content of the education provided

... . [Here] the nonpublic school controls the timing of the trips
and, within a certain range, their frequency and destinations ....
The field trips are an integral part of the educational experience,
and where the teacher works within and for a sectarian institution,

99. Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
100. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
101. Id. at 364, 366.
102. Id. at 388-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 804 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
103. Id. at 389 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Justice Rehnquist observed that less than 19%
of all students in the state attended sectarian schools. Id. at 390 n.3.
104. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
105. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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an unacceptable risk of fostering of religion is an inevitable
byproduct. 06

The dichotomy between secular and religious aspects of sectarian education, however, is illusory. Little economic insight is needed to realize
that subsidizing one area of the school operations frees funds for use
in other areas. In terms of the effect of the state aid, therefore, only
a slight difference exists between subsidizing the secular aspects of
the parochial school program and directly subsidizing its religious
aspects."0 7
Neither of the preceding primary effect analyses is particularly satisfying. Focusing on the religious or nonreligious character of the aided
instructions suffers from the somewhat arbitrary and perspectival nature
of percentages. And the distinction between the secular and religious
characteristics of a sectarian school is of little practical significance.
The decision in Widmar v. Vincent,"0 8 though, may provide a more
cogent alternative.
The coercive effect of officially-sanctioned religion has been identified as the predominant problem in establishment clause questions
raised by religious activity in the public schools.0 9 Widmar responded
to that problem by concluding that state provision of a forum open
to all forms of communication, including religious communication,
"does not confer any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects
or practices.""' As the Supreme Court apparently recognized in

106. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 253-54. In Meek v. Pittenger, the Court upheld a textbook loan
program, but invalidated a direct loan of instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic
schools. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). This somewhat mystifying distinction arose because the decisions
to validate one program and invalidate the other commanded different majorities of the Court.
See also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654-57 (1980)
(upheld state reimbursement of nonpublic school expenditures in administering and grading
standardized tests because the nonpublic schools had no control over the content or outcome
of the tests, and therefore, no substantial risk existed that the examinations would be used
for religious purposes).
107. Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 666-67
(1980) (Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting) ("[S]ubstantial direct financial aid
to a religious school, even though ostensibly for secular purposes, runs the great risk of furthering the religious mission of the school as a whole because that religious mission so pervades the functioning of the school." Id. But see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
248 (1968). "[W]e cannot agree ... that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that
the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion.") A situation
could arise in which private religious schools would not provide particular materials or services
without state funding. In most cases, however, either because of state-mandated requirements
or because of the needs and desires of parents and pupils, the parochial school would be obliged to provide the subsidized service in any event, making possible a substitution of funds.
108. 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 20-28, 41-43, 49-52 and accompanying texts.
110. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274; see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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Mueller v. Allen,'I' the same should be true outside the public school
context, when the state provides funds or services to nonpublic schools,

including religious schools. As long as the state does not discriminate
among the recipients of its assistance on the basis of the religious

content of their educational programs, state funding or aid to nonpublic schools should survive an establishment clause challenge, even

though religious institutions are included among the beneficiaries." 2
Within the confines of the public school, the "imprimatur of State

approval" is absent when students voluntarily initiate religious activity
in response to state support of all kinds of student activity." 3 Likewise,
courts should deem absent the state's imprimatur when parents and

pupils can choose voluntarily among a variety of educational programs, including religious alternatives, that are made possible by state

funding. The state, however, cannot restrict the field or condition
its assistance on the basis of the religious content of the programs

it supports."" At most this means that the state should be allowed
to spend up to the amount that it spends on each pupil in its public
schools to provide individual students with nonpublic alternatives.
Allowing the state to exceed this amount runs the risk of favoring
religious education over nonreligious alternatives.
111. Most importantly, the deduction is available for educational expenses incurred by all
parents, including those whose children attend public schools and those whose children
attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools. Just as in Widmar
v. Vincent ... where we concluded that the state's provision of a forum neutrally
"open to a broad class of religious speakers does not confer any imprimatur of State
approval," so here: "the provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups
is an important index of secular effect."
103. S. Ct. 3062, 3068 (1983).
112. See Kurland, supra note 14, at 5; see supra notes 14, 28 and accompanying texts.
113. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
114. The Mueller Court relied on an argument made elsewhere by Chief Justice Burger
that state aid to parents poses fewer establishment clause problems than direct state aid to
religious schools: "Where, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of
decisions of individual parents no 'imprimatur of State approval' . .. can be deemed to have
been conferred on any particular religion or on religion generally." Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at
3069. In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the Chief Justice argued
the following:
It is admittedly difficult to articulate the reasons why a State should be permitted
to reimburse parents of private school children... when a State is not allowed to
pay the same benefit directly to sectarian schools on a per-pupil basis. In either case,
the private individual makes the ultimate decision that may indirectly benefit churchsponsored schools; to that extent, the state involvement with religion is substantially
attenuated. The answer, I believe, lies in the experienced judgment of various members
of this Court over the years that the balance between the policies of free exercise
and establishment of religion tips in favor of the former when the legislation moves
away from direct aid to religious institutions and takes on the character of general
aid to individual families.
413 U.S. 756, 802 (1973) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The decisive
factor, however, is not that the assistance is extended formally to parents rather than to the
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The Widmar opinion, however, left open the possibility that
"empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate [the school's]
open forum"' 5 might be relevant to establishment clause analysis.'

As a practical matter, though, the greatest share of state educational
expenditures will go to public schools." 7 Further, Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Mueller declined the invitation to indulge in the
statistical analysis seemingly left open by Widmar."' This refusal was
quite proper. Just as in the public school context, the establishment
clause problem is eliminated when individuals voluntarily initiate
activity or voluntarily choose among options made possible by the

state. As long as the state does not restrict the possible alternatives,
the actual activities or options that individuals choose should have
no bearing on the establishment question."19
C.

Excessive Government Entanglement with Religion

The final prong of the Lemon test is that the state cannot "foster
an excessive entanglement with religion."'' 0 This means that governmental activity must not "involve the State 'so significantly and directly
schools, but that parents can choose among a variety of options that is unrestricted by the
state. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 249-51 (1977) ("it would exalt form over substance"
to allow the fact that the offending instructional materials were loaned to pupils rather than
to the school itself to cause a different result than that in Meek, which invalidated a direct
loan of instructional materials to nonpublic schools); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780-85, 791 (the
fact that the challenged tuition reimbursements and tax credits were channelled to parents rather
than to the schools was not controlling).
115. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981); see supra note 68.
116.
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068 n.7 (1983).
117.
In invalidating a tuition reimbursement program, the Nyquist majority distinguished
Allen and Everson because in those cases "the class of beneficiaries included all school children,
those in public as well as private schools." 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. The tuition grants, by contrast, "are given in addition to the right that [parents] have to send their children to public
schools 'totally at state expense.' And in any event, the argument [that tuition grants provide
comparable benefits to all parents of school children whether enrolled in public or nonpublic
schools] proves too much, for it would also provide a basis for approving through tuition
grants the complete subsidization of all religious schools on the ground that such action is
necessary if the State is fully to equalize the position of parents who elect such schools-a
result wholly at variance with the Establishment Clause." Id. Asserting, however, that the state
extends tuition grants in addition to the right to send children to public schools is meaningless;
as a matter of necessity, parents must elect one alternative or the other and cannot enjoy both.
The state expenditures on public education therefore must be considered in assessing the relative
impact of its expenditures on nonpublic alternatives.
118. We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral
law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens
claimed benefits under the law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by
which such statistical evidence might be evaluated.
Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
119. See id. "[T]he fact that private persons fail ... to claim the tax relief to which they
are entitled-under a facially neutral statute-should be of no consequence in determining the
constitutionality of the statute permitting such relief." Id.
120. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
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in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to . divisive influences
and inhibitions of freedom."" 2 ' State programs that survive the purpose and effect inquiries detailed above, however, should not pose
this danger. While the state may impose minimum educational standards and economic criteria that will require the state to monitor the
various schools to ensure compliance, this monitoring will be the same
for all groups involved regardless of the religious or nonreligious nature
of their activities.' 22 Rigid surveillance to ensure that nonpublic school
personnel play a strictly nonideological role or that state funds are
used only for secular purposes is not required. 23 Characterizing and
resolving the primary effect question in the way suggested above'24
has obviated the need for this kind of entangling monitoring, because
the focus of the inquiry is shifted from the religious or nonreligious
content of the recipient's institutions or activities to the neutrality
or uniformity with which the state dispenses aid. Under the approach
developed here, therefore, entanglement is not an issue.
This conclusion suggests a more general criticism of the entanglement inquiry. No matter how the primary effect issue is addressed,
resolving that issue necessarily resolves the entanglement question as
well.' 25 Each time the Supreme Court has examined both primary effect
and entanglement in reference to a particular program, it has resolved
the two issues the same way.' 26 Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roemer
121. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg and Harlan,
J.J., concurring)).
122. When faced with an annual subsidy to private colleges requiring annual verification,
Justice Blackmun wrote this: "[C]ontacts between the [Maryland Council for Higher Education] and the colleges are not likely to be any more entangling than the inspections and audits
incident to the normal process of the colleges' accreditations by the state." Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 763-64 (1976).
123. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1971) ("The very restrictions and
surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role give rise to
entanglements between church and state.") The Lemon Court found entanglement in the need
for annual audits to determine how much of the total expenditure was attributable to secular
education and how much to religious activity. Id. at 620.
124. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
125. Justice White, dissenting in Lemon, argued the following:
The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and the parochial schools.
The State cannot finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in
the same classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught...
and enforces it, it is then entangled in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 668 (1971). (White, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (Minnesota tax deduction satisfies
primary effect test and is not entangling); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (reimbursing parochial schools for administering standardized tests
has primarily a secular effect and suggests no excessive entanglement); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977) (provision of diagnostic services on nonpublic school premises creates no
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v. Board of Public Works'" provides a particularly good example
of this parallelism.
In Roemer, Justice Blackmun held that a Maryland subsidy of
private colleges did not have a primary effect of advancing religion.
He based his conclusion on a finding that the colleges involved were
not "pervasively sectarian."'' He again focused on the character of
the aided institutions to support his conclusion that the Maryland
scheme did not foster excessive entanglement: "The finding that the
colleges perform an essentially secular function is also important for
purposes of the entanglement test because it means that secular
activities, for the most part, can be taken at face value. .

.

. The

need for close surveillance of purportedly secular activities is correspondingly reduced."' 29 This prompted Justice White's criticism that
the Roemer Court had left unclear the status of entanglement as a
separate test. Justice White observed, "It is not clear that the 'weight
and contours of entanglement as a separate constitutional criterion'
... are

any more settled now than when they first surfaced. Today's

plurality opinion leaves the impression that the criterion really may
not be 'separate' at all."' 30
Justice White's criticism is well taken. Analyzing entanglement adds
nothing that cannot be uncovered by properly addressing the primary
effect inquiry. If the requisite illicit primary effect is present, no need
exists to examine entanglement; if that effect is not present, however,
the state need not engage in monitoring or surveillance activities that
create a risk of entanglement.
This can be illustrated by analyzing Walz v. Tax Commission, 3 ,
a 1970 case which upheld a New York property tax exemption granted
to religious organizations for properties used exclusively for religious
purposes. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion scarcely mentioned
the primary effect of the exemption, but the Court concluded that
impermissible risk of fostering ideological views and will not lead to entanglement; therapeutic,
remedial, and guidance services provided by public employees away from nonpublic school
premises will not have an impermissible primary effect and will not lead to entanglement; provision of field trip transportation has impermissible primary effect and would involve excessive

entanglement); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (aiding private colleges
does not have primary effect of advancing religion and does not foster excessive entanglement).
In two cases, however, the Court rested its decision exclusively on an examination of entanglement, without considering the primary effect of the statutes involved. See Lemon v. Kcurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970).
127. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
128. Id. at 755-59.

129. Id. at 762.
130. Id. at 769 (White and Rehnquist, J.J., concurring) (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 822 (1973) (White and Rehnquist, J.J., Burger,

C.J., dissenting)).
131.

397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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the exemption did not foster an excessive entanglement between church
and state. 32 If Walz stands for the proposition that the state may
grant a tax exemption to various groups, including religious groups,
who perform certain services, such as maintaining a hospital or library,
without violating the establishment clause, 133 then the primary effect
analysis set out above' 34 would suggest that the case was decided correctly. By granting the exemption, the state merely makes a general
benefit available to various groups without regard to the religious or
nonreligious nature of their activities. A discussion of entanglement
is not necessary to reach this result. But if, as is more likely, Walz
upheld a tax exemption that was tailored specifically to benefit religious
organizations, 135 then the preceding analysis would suggest that the
case was decided incorrectly. Once again, discussing entanglement is
unnecessary to the analysis.
In sum, analyzing entanglement between church and state adds
nothing to the primary effect analysis detailed earlier. This is particularly true if the approach advocated in this article is adopted. In
fact, this may be generally true no matter how the primary effect
question is addressed.
CONCLUSION

The cases dealing with religious activity in the public schools may
provide a way to resolve the uncertainty over permissible state aid
to religious schools. The problem presented in the public schools is
that the state risks officially sanctioning religion or particular religious
activity. That problem is not present, however, when the state merely
permits individuals to initiate religious activities voluntarily by furnishing its facilities for all groups and activities.
Similar principles should govern state funding of religious education. In assessing the primary effect of such efforts, courts should
ask whether the state is merely making its resources uniformly available
to all groups without regard to the religious content of their educational activities. If the state expends greater resources in aiding religious

132.
133.

Id. at 674-76.
See id. at 697 (opinion of Harlan, J.) ("To the extent that religious institutions spon-

sor the secular activities that this legislation is designed to promote, it is consistent with neutrality
to grant them an exemption just as other organizations devoting resources to these projects

receive exemptions.")
134. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
135. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 ("We find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on

the social welfare service or 'good works' that some churches perform for parishioners and
others .... ").
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educators than it uses per capita in its public schools or if it
discriminates among recipients on religious lines, then the legislation
at issue should be invalidated. This appears to be the approach taken
by the Supreme Court in Mueller v. Allen. Mueller, therefore, may

present an opportunity to introduce some rationality into this area.
While a limited inquiry into legislative purpose would be in order,
an analysis of entanglement adds nothing to the primary effect inquiry and should be discarded.

